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1 Introduction
An election is a significant event in many democratic
countries, however, traditional voting systems are
often not efficient and convenient enough given the
large number of areas and population involved in
modern elections. Also, in some cases traditional
voting systems have design flaws, for example the
confusing “butterfly ballot” in the United States
presidential election in Florida, 2000 [1] [2]. Faced
with these shortcomings of traditional paper based
voting systems, many research works have explored
the possibility of using E-voting systems in real
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elections [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]. Based on the locations
where E-voting systems are used, they can be
divided into three categories: poll, info-kiosk and
remote E-voting systems [9]. In the former two
categories, authorities still have at least partial
physical control of elections, while in remote E-
voting systems the processes are not physically
supervised by authorities [10]. As [11] pointed out,
remote E-voting systems allow people to cast their
votes over the Internet, from home, or any other
location as long as they have access to Internet.
In this paper, we mainly focus on remote E-
voting systems. Compared with traditional paper
based voting systems, remote E-voting systems
provide voters a convenient and efficient approach.
There are a few countries, including Estonia and
Switzerland, that currently have the option (or in
partial areas) of casting ballots through Internet in
their elections [12].
Remote E-voting systems have not yet been
widely deployed in practical elections due to several
potential security issues, e.g. accountability and
verifiability [13]. For example, Tadayoshi Kohno
et al. analyzed an E-voting system in [14], and
they concluded that there are still several potential
security issues which are previously undetected in
this system. Like traditional paper based voting
systems, remote E-voting systems should satisfy
several very basic requirements in order to be
acceptable in elections, for example, correctness,
verifiability, privacy and so on [15]. apart from these
requirements, remote E-voting systems pose some
new challenges which traditional paper based voting
systems do not, for example, software flaws, man-
in-middle attacks and denial of services [16].
One of the main challenges that prevent remote
E-voting systems from being practically deployed
is that some of their requirements or properties
are incompatible and difficult to be implemented
simultaneously [17] [18]. Such incompatibility also
provides attackers opportunities. As elections are
very sensitive political topics in many countries,
they become popular targets for malicious attackers.
In our previous paper [19], we classified remote
E-voting systems into four categories based on how
they achieve vote-privacy. Although we mentioned
receipt-freeness, the focus of interest of [19] is to
provide a general survey for existing remote E-
voting systems’ primary cryptographic techniques:
mix-nets, blind signature, threshold homomorphic
encryption and secret sharing. In this paper,
we specifically focus on three important security
properties related to voters: receipt-freeness, vote-
selling resistance and voter-coercion resistance. In
such scenarios, voters are willing or forced to
cooperate with attackers, which makes the elections
very complicated [15] [20] [21].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: we
introduce the general voting flow and background of
remote E-voting systems in Section 2. Definition and
features of three voter related security properties are
described in Section 3, as well as some protection
measures that defend against corresponding attacks
in Section 4. We then examine several existing
remote E-voting systems in Section 5. In Section
6, we compare these systems from different
perspectives. Finally, we conclude this paper in
Section 7.
2 Remote E-voting systems
2.1 An overview of a remote E-voting
system’s voting flow
There are many proposed remote E-voting systems
[8] [10] [22] [12] [23] [24]. Although these
systems have some slight differences, most of
them have a general voting flow. In remote E-
voting systems, involved entities include voters,
candidates, registrars (or authorities), tallies,
bulletin board, and potentially other additional
components in some systems such as auditors.
Candidates’ information should be available to
all the voters. The main role of registrars
is to authenticate voters’ eligibility. Tallies are
responsible for collecting and verifying ballots, and
finally tabulating the results. From the bulletin
board, all the observers can see the manipulation of
ballots in the elections. A general remote E-voting
voting flow includes the following four steps [9]:
• Setup or initialization. In this stage,
systems should be initialized and make
necessary information available. For example,
authorities (or registrars) publish candidates’
information and instructions of how to vote
for candidates on bulletin board. Many remote
E-voting systems encrypt voters’ ballots (e.g.
ElGamal [25], RSA [10] and so on) in order
to achieve vote-privacy and confidentiality,
therefore authorities or tallies need to publish
encryption information, like public keys which
will be used in the voting stage. For those
systems which need to decrypt encrypted
ballots, tallies hold the private keys and keep
them secret.
• Registration. Before casting votes for
candidates, voters firstly have to be
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authenticated by registrars for their eligibility.
Registrars will check voters’ eligibility
and record eligible voters. At the same
time eligible voters will obtain necessary
information, e.g. tokens, credentials or
encrypted ballots, from registrars which will
be used during the voting process. In order to
be more robust, many systems usually have
multiple registrars working together, rather
than having a single registrar.
• Voting. In this stage, voters choose their
intended candidate and include them in their
ballots. To achieve vote-privacy, most remote
E-voting systems encrypt ballots. Voters’
evidences of their eligibility should be included
in order for tallies to further verify ballots’
eligibility. In systems using credentials, voters
will include them in their ballots; voters
can also use blind signature to show their
eligibility [26]. Additionally, some systems
also contain proof to prove that they follow
predefined protocols [25].
• Tallying. In this stage, tallies verify and
validate ballots, count them and then publish
the results. Counting policies can be defined
by the administrators or governments in
different elections. Moreover, many systems
provide audiences or auditors with proof that
can prove the correctness of elections.
As we described above, Figure 1 shows the
general voting flow of remote E-voting systems.
Apart from these four steps, some remote E-voting
systems may contain some additional steps for
various specific security purposes. For example,
encrypted ballots are anonymized using mix-nets in
[10] before being tallied.
2.2 Security properties of remote E-voting
systems
As we stated before, remote E-voting systems
should satisfy certain requirements before they
can be widely deployed in important elections.
Remote E-voting systems, as voting systems, are
supposed to have basic functional properties, such
as correctness, democracy, fairness, accountability
and transparency [19] [18] [15]. However, in this
paper we mainly focus on the following properties
related to security.
• Privacy [27]. Privacy in remote E-voting
systems contains two aspects [18]. First of all,
voters’ personal information, such as social
security number or biometrics, should not
revealed to any one else. Secondly, voters’
ballots, including their choices, should also be
kept unrevealed. In remote E-voting systems,
even authorities and tallies should not have
any knowledge of voters’ choices.
• Verifiability [28]. Verifiability is an important
property to guarantee the correctness
of elections; it can be divided into two
categories: universal verifiability and
individual verifiability. Universal verifiability
requires that the correctness of elections’
results can be verified by all the observers.
To clearly define individual verifiability, we
further divide it into two subcategories: weak
individual verifiability and strong verifiability.
Weak individual verifiability allows voters
to verify if their ballots reach authorities or
bulletin board and are included in the tallying
stage; however, in most remote E-voting
systems ballots are encrypted. In other words,
voters may not be able to verify their votes,
which include their candidate choices. Thus,
individual verifiability in [26] and [25] actually
refers to weak individual verifiability. On the
other hand, in addition to weak individual
verifiability’s properties, strong individual
verifiability also allows voters to verify their
own candidate choices (i.e., their votes in
clear or plain format) and to verify that their
votes are accurately counted in tallied results.
For example in [8], voters can not only verify
their cast ballots (each ballot is a mixed value
containing a part of one’s own vote and the
partial values of other voters’ votes) but also
use their secret location information to verify
for whom their votes are casted (i.e., their true
vote) and to visually verify that their votes are
counted in the final tally. Unfortunately this
is not receipt-free. It is obvious, though, that
strong individual verifiability provide more
verification than weak individual verifiability.
• Robustness or reliability [29]. Robustness here
refers to systems’ vulnerabilities to attacks. In
the case that some registrars, tallies or voters
are corrupted by attackers, remote E-voting
systems should still be able to work correctly.
• Receipt-freeness [27]. There is no way (or
receipt from voting machines) for voters to
prove to attackers that they voted in a
certain way even when they are willing to do
so. Receipt-freeness can prohibit voters from
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Figure 1: General voting flow of remote E-voting systems
proving to others their choices. Therefore it is
used as a common method to mitigate vote-
selling [30].
• Vote-selling resistance [30]. In some cases,
voters are willing to sell their votes to buyers
and follow buyers’ instructions. However, in
order to convince buyers, they have to prove
that they vote in the way the buyers desire.
Sellers have two ways of accomplishing this:
directly selling their credentials (or identities)
to buyers, or providing buyers with proof of
vote, e.g. receipt [31] [32].
• Voter-coercion resistance [12]. Voters should
be able to cast their ballots as they intended,
even when they are forced by coercers to vote
for other candidates. At the same time coerced
voters should be able to disguise themselves
without letting coercers know. This assumes
that voters and attackers can communicate
with each other in the voting process [15].
In the following of this paper, we will specifically
focus on the last three properties. We will see how
remote E-voting systems can satisfy these three
properties in order to defend against corresponding
attacks.
2.3 Cryptography primitives
In this section, we briefly introduce some
cryptography primitives which are widely used in
remote E-voting systems. More complete details
can be found in [33].
2.3.1 Blind signature (BS)
Blind signature was proposed by David Chaum in
1983 [34]. Before the sender sends her/his message
to the signer, she/he blinds or disguises her/his
message with some random factors. In such a way,
the signer signs the sender’s message but without
knowing its content. In remote E-voting systems,
this is used for voters to obtain signatures from
authorities without leaking their votes [26]. Blind
signature can be implemented by very common
public key cryptosystems, such as RSA.
2.3.2 Threshold encryption and decryption/
secret sharing
Threshold encryption and decryption are widely
used in many applications in order to avoid
single point failure. In such cases, encryption and
decryption are conducted by authorities together
[35]. Agents always use secret sharing [36] to
share keys. Many remote E-voting systems use this
mechanism to perform registration and decryption
distributively [10] [12] [23] [25]. This can prevent
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attackers from breaking into systems, unless they
control the majority of authorities involved.
2.3.3 Homomorphic encryption and re-
encryption
Homomorphic encryption enables a system
to do some specific encryption of plain-
texts, without exposing plain-texts [37]. For
example, Encrypt(m1 ⊕m2) = Encrypt(m1)⊗
Encrypt(m2). In this case, plain-text m1 and
m2 are not revealed, although we know the
encryption of m1 ⊕m2. This feature is used to
achieve anonymization in remote E-voting systems
[10], to add up ballots without leaking votes [10]
[12] [25]. In addition, by using the properties of
homomorphic encryption, it is possible to construct
another cipher-text c
′
, given cipher-text c, for the
same plain-text m. This is called re-encryption of
plain-text m.
2.3.4 Mix-nets
Mix-nets M is another very important and widely
used cryptography primitive in remote E-voting
systems [38]. It takes a sequence of inputs, which
can be encrypted ballots generated in the voting
stage; each agent in M will perform some secure and
random permutations on their inputs and output
permuted results to the next agent [39]. In this
case, the order of the inputs will be shuffled, thus
maintaining voters’ anonymity in remote E-voting
systems.
2.3.5 Plain-text equivalence test (PET)
Given two cipher-texts, authorities are able to make
a judgment as to whether two underlying plain-texts
are the same or not, without revealing two plain-
texts [38]. It can be used to help tallies verify valid
ballots [25].
2.3.6 Zero-knowledge proof (ZKF)
Zero-knowledge proof is one of the most commonly
used methods for security protocols, as well as for
remote E-voting systems. It was first introduced
in [40]. Zero-knowledge proof allows the prover
to convince the verifiers that a given statement
is true or false without revealing any additional
information. It is essential for interactive protocols,
such as universal verifiability and coercion-evidence
in remote E-voting systems [25].
2.3.7 Designated verifier proof
For knowledge proof, some can be verified by many
users; however, in some cases, we want to make sure
that such proof are only verifiable to the specific
users. Designated verifier proof is designed only for
intended verifiers; except the designated verifiers,
no one else is able to obtain conviction, even if the
verifiers give their private information to others [41].
3 Properties: receipt-freeness, vote-
selling resistance and voter-coercion
resistance
3.1 Receipt-freeness
Receipt-freeness, first introduced in [27] and [30], is
considered a very important property for remote E-
voting systems and many research works have been
dedicated to it [7] [23] [42] [43]. It means that voters
are not able to provide any proof of their voting
strategies to others. Voting machines (including also
registrars and tallies) do not provide voters receipts,
but also voters themselves are not able to construct
such type of proof. As we stated above, receipt-
freeness is essential for remote E-voting systems to
prevent vote-selling and voter-coercion.
3.2 Vote-selling resistance
Vote-selling refers to scenarios in which voters, for
some reason, are willing to sell their votes to buyers.
This process includes following buyers’ instructions
and communicating with buyers during the voting
process [25]. Traditionally, vote-selling is considered
illegal and is prohibited in elections.
Voters typically have two ways to sell their
ballots [30]. They can directly sell their credentials
or tokens to buyers; in such cases, buyers can the
cast the compromised ballots by themselves using
the sellers’ identities. From tallies’ or registrars’
points of view, it is impossible to identify whether
or not such ballots are cast by real, eligible voters or
buyers, as they use the same credentials. Apart from
this, without selling private credentials, sellers can
cast for candidates following buyers’ instructions.
However, there exists a challenge for sellers in
both scenarios. How can sellers convince buyers
that they are doing what buyers pay them to do?
In the first case, how do buyers know whether or
not sellers give them real credentials? If they are
real, how can buyers make sure that sellers will
not re-submit ballots [9]? Similarly, how can sellers
prove to buyers that they have followed buyers’
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instructions, and do not make any changes after
that? Without such proof, sellers cannot convince
buyers. This can provide opportunity for a remote
E-voting system to prevent vote-selling.
3.3 Voter-coercion resistance
In elections, it is possible for voters to be coerced by
attackers to follow their instructions. In such cases,
attackers can disrupt the elections or even control
the elections’ results. Therefore, to make remote E-
voting systems fair and robust, they should be voter-
coercion resistant [43].
Voter-coercion resistance requires remote E-
voting systems to allow coerced voters still be able
to cast for their intended candidates as if they
were not coerced, and without being detected by
attackers. However, as pointed out in [15], it has
no well-agreed formal definition for the concept
of voter-coercion resistance; it is usually only
stated in natural language. Juels et al. proposed
a computational definition in [12], and authors
in [44] analyzed voter-coercion resistance in an
epistemic approach. [25] divided voter-coercion into
two categories: explicit coercion and silent coercion,
where silent coercion also takes credential leakage
into account. Based on observational equivalence,
[15] defined voter-coercion resistance as:
“Coercion-resistance is formalized as
an observational equivalence too. In the
case of coercion-resistance, the attacker
(which we may also call the coercer)
is assumed to communicate with Alice
during the protocol, and can prepare
messages which she should send during
the election process. This gives the
coercer much more power. [15]”
Again receipt-freeness is necessary to defeat
voter-coercion. If voters have ways to prove their
voting strategies to a third party, then attackers can
also force voters to prove to them their choices. We
see several different measures in literature intended
to defeat voter-coercion [10] [12] [45] [46].
[12] also described three types of attacks –
Randomization attack, Forced-abstention attack
and Simulation attack, depending on coercers’
purposes in remote E-voting systems, and some of
attackers’ capabilities are described in [10]. Note
that even when receipt-freeness is achieved, these
attacks are still possible.
3.4 Relation among receipt-freeness,
vote-selling resistance, and voter-coercion
resistance
Receipt-freeness is an important property for
remote E-voting systems, particularly, for vote-
selling resistance and voter-coercion resistance in
order to counter the corresponding two types of
attacks. They are similar and interrelated, and
their definitions have evolved as more research
works appeared in this field. For example receipt-
freeness originally was used to denote the security
property including both receipt-freeness and voter-
coercion resistance in [31]. While in [43], [15] and
[12] authors differentiated them and suggested that
voter-coercion is a stronger concept than receipt-
freeness. Here we illustrate the relation among the
three properties in Figure 2.
Among these three properties, receipt-freeness
serves as the most basic and necessary requirement
for vote-selling resistance and voter-coercion
resistance [15] [12]. If systems are not receipt-free,
voters are given or are able to construct receipts
which can prove to others for whom they cast
their votes. In such scenarios, voters can convince
buyers, or coercers can force coerced voters, to show
them receipts. Therefore, without receipt-freeness,
it is impossible for systems to achieve vote-selling
resistance and voter-coercion resistance [27]. Of
course, in order to achieve vote-selling resistance
and voter-coercion resistance, several additional
assumptions (or policies) are needed. For example
systems should allow voters to revote, attackers
cannot physically monitor voters’ behaviors [30]
[10], and so on.
Besides showing buyers receipts, sellers have
another way to convince buyers: directly selling
private information, e.g. credentials or tokens.
Therefore, in order to prevent voters from selling
their votes, in addition to receipt-freeness, systems
should also prohibit selling credentials or tokens.
This can be implemented through some policies
or hardware factors. For example, associating
credentials with identities or biometrics, such as
social security numbers and finger-prints [47], may
make it more difficult to sell credentials. Conversely,
the introduction of such sensitive information into
remote E-voting systems creates other privacy and
security concerns [48]. Another way to prevent a
seller from selling credentials is to make the proof of
correctness of credentials non-transferable to buyers
[30].
Voter-coercion resistance, as stated in [12] and
[15], is a stronger and broader concept than receipt-
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Figure 2: Relation among receipt-freeness, vote-selling resistance and voter-coercion resistance
freeness. We can see that receipt-freeness itself is
not enough to defend against randomization attack,
forced-abstention attack and simulation attack as
defined in [10] [21]. In voter-coercion resistant
systems, coerced voters should be able to pretend to
follow coercers’ instructions. In other words, given
the public results from bulletin board, coercers are
not able to find whether or not coerced voters
disobey their instructions [25]. Voter-coercion is a
tough problem, and as pointed out in [49], remote
E-voting systems are inherently coercible. Some
researchers have even proposed voter-coercion with
modified meaning: coercion-evidence [25].
3.5 Trust assumptions
As we have seen already, in order to satisfy
these security properties, many systems make
assumptions, such as attackers cannot physically
monitor voters’ behaviors. Here we are mainly
concerned two types of assumptions: channel
assumptions and agent assumptions. Channel
assumptions describe which kinds of channels
are needed in remote E-voting systems. Agent
assumptions refer to the notion that in order for
systems to work correctly, there is a maximum
threshold of how many agents, including authorities,
voters, registrars, can be corrupted by attackers.
3.5.1 Channel trust assumptions
There are two possible trust assumptions regarding
channels in remote E-voting systems: anonymous
channels and untappable channels [9] [26].
• Anonymous channel. Anonymous channel
is also called untraceable channel and
was firstly proposed in [39] using mix-net
technique. It is designed for anonymous
communication between the sender and the
receiver. The receiver receives messages from
the sender through anonymous channel, but
the receiver cannot identify the sender’s
identity. Therefore, if an anonymous channel
is eavesdropped by attackers, they cannot
figure out the sources of ballots. As indicated
in the full version of [12], this can be
achieved by use of anonymization, such as
mixing, homomorphic encryption and so on.
An anonymous channel is essential in receipt-
free and voter-coercion resistant remote E-
voting systems [15] [12].
• Untappable channel. Untappable channel is
more difficult to achieve in reality than
anonymous channel. Apart from anonymity,
it also requires that messages in untappable
channels cannot be revealed to attackers. In
other words, it is a perfect secure channel
that will never leak any messages [42].
Unfortunately, in practical remote E-voting
systems, untappable channel usually cannot
be guaranteed or realized. It is the known
weakest physical assumption in receipt-free
remote E-voting systems [50].
3.5.2 Agent trust assumptions
Like many other applications, remote E-voting
systems also make some trust assumptions about
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participants or agents [25]. For example, in
some systems none of the agents, like registrars
and tallies, can be corrupted by attackers in
order to maintain systems’ normal operations;
other systems make assumptions that attackers
can compromise part of the agents, and the
systems can still work correctly. In the following
discussions, we divide this into two categories: non-
corrupted assumption and minor (or threshold)
corrupted assumption. Obviously, non-corrupted is
a more strict assumption than minor-corrupted.
Usually systems requiring non-corruptability are
not as robust as those requiring minor-corrupted
requirements.
4 Protection measures
In this section, we introduce the attributes of
receipt-freeness, vote-selling resistance and voter-
coercion resistance, as well as some protection
measures in order to satisfy them. In the later
section, we will see whether or not existing remote
E-voting systems satisfy them, and how to achieve
them.
4.1 Protection measures for receipt-freeness
In order to achieve receipt-freeness, as pointed out
in [31], there are several requirements that remote
E-voting systems have to satisfy.
• Private ballots. Voters’ ballots should be
encrypted and attackers cannot get access
to plain-texts, for example attackers cannot
physically witness remote terminals [30]. This
can be achieved by using encryption in the
voting stage.
• Secret decryption key. For those systems
which have decryption keys to decrypt every
single encrypted ballot, voters should not have
any knowledge of the decryption keys in order
to prevent them from providing decrypted
information to attackers. For robustness,
many remote E-voting systems distribute
decryption keys among multiple tallies [10]
[21] [25] [50].
• Randomness. Randomness contains two parts:
randomness in voters’ encrypted ballots
and ballots’ random orders [31]. In many
cryptosystems, plain-text is usually encrypted
with a random number, e.g. RSA. As shown
in [50], voters can use random numbers to
generate receipts. Therefore, voters should
have no knowledge about random numbers,
and the ballots should be encrypted by a
third party. To convince voters that their
votes are correctly encrypted, the third party
should provide voters proof. In addition
to that, in order to prevent voters from
transferring proof to attackers, proof should
be non-transferable [50]. In remote E-voting
systems, zero-knowledge proof and designated
verifier proof are among the most commonly
used non-transferable proof [41]. In order to
achieve anonymity, encrypted ballots need to
be randomized before they are sent to the
bulletin board. This randomization can be
achieved by using randomization techniques,
e.g. mix-net. Similarly, this randomness
information must be unrevealed to voters and
tallies.
4.2 Protection measures for vote-selling
resistance
As we stated above, sellers can either sell their
credentials to buyers or cast ballots following
buyers’ instructions [30]. Therefore, in order to
prevent vote-selling, remote E-voting systems also
need to focus on these two possibilities.
The idea to defend against these two selling
strategies is the same: make the system function
such that sellers cannot convince buyers of their
votes. For users’ ballots, as long as systems satisfy
receipt-freeness, sellers cannot provide proof to
buyers of their actual votes [51] [24] [50]. Similarly
for credentials, if sellers cannot prove to buyers
that the given credentials are real, buyers will
not pay them, so proof of credentials’ correctness
should be non-transferable [25] [30]. In other words,
proof can only be verified by voters themselves.
Also systems can make credentials associated with
voters’ biometrics such that sellers may not be
willing to sell their biometrics [47]; however this type
of defense mechanism is out of this paper’s scope.
4.3 Protection measures for voter-coercion
resistance
To protect systems from voter-coercion attacks,
several measures have been proposed in recent years.
• Explicit notification. This is a straightforward
and intuitive method. In some cases, when
voters are coerced, they can use another
separate channel to send an explicit coercion
proof to registrars or tallies to indicate that
they are coerced [52]. This method requires
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there exist an untappable channel that can be
used to send notifications.
• Fake credential. In the case that voter is
coerced, she/he can generate a fake credential
and give it to the coercer or use the fake
credential to cast for the candidates the
coercer has indicated [10] [12] [45] [46]. In
such cases, a coercer cannot distinguish fake
credentials from real credentials, and only the
majority part of tallies together can detect
these invalid credentials contained in the
ballots [12].
• Panic password. This measure is very similar
to that of fake credential. Panic password
systems can generate two types of passwords:
panic password and real password [53].
When voters log onto systems to cast
ballots, using either panic passwords or real
passwords, systems will not promote error
message to users when users enter panic
passwords; however, systems can distinguish
panic passwords from real passwords, and only
with a real password can users be identified
in the later tallying stages. In other words,
although attackers holding panic passwords
can go through the whole process as real
voters, systems will not count their ballots.
In voter-coercion cases, voters can give panic
passwords to coercers and at the same time
keep their real passwords secret [26].
• Coercion-evidence. Using this measure, the
suspiciously coerced ballots are recorded. In
this case, instead of using fake credentials
to deceive coercers, the systems ask coerced
voters to submit their ballots at least for
two different candidates (one follows coercer’s
instruction, and one for their own intended
candidates). System using coercion-evidence
[25] can finally tell auditors how many voters
are suspiciously being coerced.
5 Existing remote E-voting systems
Here, we present an overview of some existing
remote E-voting systems. Among them, we examine
whether or not they satisfy the above three security
properties, and if so what mechanisms they used.
5.1 Hirt et al. [50]
In [50], candidate options are encrypted by
authorities in advance and then sent to voters in
the voting stage. However, the order of candidate
options are randomized by multiple authorities.
In order to instruct voters to select encrypted
candidate options for their intended candidates,
the order is conveyed to voters using designated
verifier proof [41]. In the tallying stage, tallies use
homomorphic encryption to sum up ballots and also
provide correctness proof for universal verifiability.
As candidate options are encrypted by
authorities, voters do not have any randomness
knowledge about the encryption. Authorities shuffle
and re-encrypt votes, and prove the order of
candidate options to voters using 1-out-of-L re-
encryption proof [54] [55] [56]. Also using designated
verifier proof, voters are not able to transfer this
proof to buyers or coercers [41]. However, coerced
voters’ deceits can still be detected by coercers,
therefore, it is not voter-coercion resistant.
5.2 Lee et al. [23]
Lee et al. proposed a mechanism for mix-net based
remote E-voting systems to achieve receipt-freeness
in [23]. The main idea of [23] is similar to [50].
In it voters have no knowledge of the randomness
of the encryptions. Instead of being encrypted
by the authorities, voters and a third party
randomizer encrypt votes together using so called
designated-verifier re-encryption proof (DVRP).
Basically, after receiving voters’ encrypted ballots,
the randomizer re-encrypts them and generates the
final encrypted ballots. Also, the randomizer uses
designed verifier proof to show voters that their
votes are re-encrypted correctly. This proof cannot
be transferred to third party.
The randomizer in this scheme is a very
important component, as without it the system
cannot provide randomness. The randomizer is
implemented by a secure hardware device called
a tamper resistant randomizer (TRR) [5]. The
communications between voters and TRR should
not be revealed to attackers. In their case, the
authors assume that TRR is part of voters’
computer, and the communication links are internal
physical links. So it is equal to the assumption of
untappable channel between voters and TRR.
In the final tallying stage, without using
homomorphic encryption, [23] has to decrypt every
single encrypted ballot one by one, using uses
threshold cryptography scheme in the encryption
and decryption processes. Unfortunately, this
scheme is not voter-coercion resistant, as voters are
not able to disguise themselves.
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5.3 Juels et al. [12]
In [12], each eligible voter gets a secret credential
from registrars. In the voting stage, voters encrypt
both their credentials and their choices using tallies’
public key. Apart from this, ballots also include
the proof that voters know encrypted credentials
and candidate options, along with proof of the
validations of their options. Any ballot without
valid proof will be eliminated in the tallying stage.
Credentials and candidate options are stored in two
separate vectors, but with the same corresponding
orders. Both credentials and candidate options
will then pass through mix-nets with the same
permutation in order to achieve anonymity. In the
case that coercion happens, coerced voters can
give coercers fake credentials or vote with fake
credentials for them. Coercers cannot verify whether
or not these given credentials are valid.
This protocol requires untappable channels in
the registration stage, which means voters’ secret
credentials cannot be disclosed to coercers. Smith et
al. [57] proposed an efficient scheme based on [12],
but it is not secure [46].
5.4 Civitas [10]
Civitas [10] was proposed by Michael R. Clarkson
et al. in 2008; it aims to refine and improve
[12]. Like other systems, voters are assumed to
be able to get their private credentials with
guaranteed integrity, and the corresponding public
credentials are published in the bulletin board.
Private credentials (shares) are generated by
distributed registrars (called registration tellers in
the paper) using Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol
[58], which means unless attackers corrupt all or
the majority of the registration tellers, they cannot
know voters’ private credentials.
The key idea to defend against voter-coercion
in Civitas is the same as [12] – coerced voters can
construct fake credentials and use fake credentials
to do whatever coercers desire. To forge a fake
credential, voters are required to modify at least
one of the private credential shares (obtained
from distributed registration tellers). Therefore,
it requires at least one registration teller not
be corrupted by attackers, and that there exists
an untappable channel between voters and this
trustworthy registrar.
Apart from this, for scalability reasons, voters
are grouped into blocks. This helps Civitas reduce
computation time, while [12] does not take time
efficiency into account. Other differences between
[12] and Civitas, including concrete instantiations of
cryptographic components, can be found in [10].
5.5 Helios [52]
Helios was designed mainly for the purpose of
low-coercion applications [52]. It highlights the
verifiability in remote E-voting systems. In Helios,
voters do not need to be authenticated until
they cast votes. Under such a situation, anyone
can participate and test the system. Ballots are
encrypted and displayed in a hash of cipher-
texts. Voters can audit their ballots by asking the
authorities to display their corresponding cipher-
texts. After a voter audits her/his ballot, she/he
can choose to re-encrypt her/his ballot again. To
deal with coercion, Helios allows voters to send a
separate explicit coercion proof to the authorities;
however it does not take interactions among voters
and coercers into account, which means it is possible
that coercers can detect the explicit coercion proof
as well. Therefore, Helios is still vulnerable to
coercion, which makes it suitable only for low-
coercion elections. Also, Helios has printable non-
encrypted receipts, so it is not receipt-free.
5.6 Helios2.0 [22]
Ben Adida et.al. analyzed Helios and improved
it in [22]. Helios2.0 uses the same encryption
mechanism as Helios; however, instead of using mix-
net to shuffle votes in the tallying stage, Helios2.0
uses homomorphic encryption mechanism and so
does not need to decrypt ballots one by one. It
uses exponential ElGamal system and distributive
encryption. In order to achieve verifiability,
they designed two programs: election tallying
program and election verification program. They
also improved the user interface. Unfortunately,
Helios2.0 is also not receipt-free.
5.7 PGD [59]
In Pretty Good Democracy (PGD) [59], voters
use code sheets [60] to cast votes for their
intended candidates. In each code sheet, vote
codes for candidates are randomized and pairwise
distinct. It means that given a voter’s vote code,
no one else knows her/his intended candidate.
Moreover, vote codes are encrypted by authorities
and some trustees. In the voting stage, voters
enter their ballots IDs and vote codes; voting
servers will then check ballots IDs for eligibility;
and then encrypt and send them to trustees if
they are valid. If trustees find vote codes are
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matchable with their corresponding ballots’ codes,
they will decrypt acknowledgment codes which will
be sent back to voters by voting servers. Therefore,
PGD provides individual verifiability. Furthermore,
acknowledgment codes are per code sheet rather
than for individual candidate choices, so PGD offers
receipt-freeness. However voters can sell their code
sheets to attackers, therefore PGD is neither vote-
selling resistant nor voter-coercion resistant.
5.8 Meng et al. [45]
[45] uses [61]’s commitment scheme (called BCP
commitment scheme in [45]) to generate keys
which are used in voters’ identity validation in
an interactive way. After validation registrars send
voters deniable encryptions of candidate options,
voters will select and encrypt candidate choices
using BCP commitment scheme. In the tallying
stage, tallies can use collision-find algorithm to
verify valid ballots. Since voters are able to generate
fake credentials (using dishonest opening in deniable
encryption scheme [62]) and deceive coercers, it
is receipt-free and voter-coercion resistant. More
importantly, this system does not need untappable
channels, which is a relaxed physical assumption
when compared with other systems.
5.9 AFT [46]
AFT [46], developed by R.Araujo et al., employs
some of [12]’s ideas. It also allows voters to
generate fake credentials under decision Diffie-
Hellman (DDH) problem’s assumption [63] and give
them to coercers in the case that they are coerced.
Instead of using random strings as credentials, it
uses a tuple with the form of σ = (r, a, b, c). Unless
the voter reveals her/his r to coercers, coercers
cannot distinguish a fake credential from a real one;
and (a, b, c) is not necessary to be sent through an
untappable channel. Apart from this, if (r, a, b, c) is
valid, then (r, al, bl, cl) is also valid. In other words,
the voter can change the value of (a, b, c), and she/he
can still be identified as long as she/he keeps using
the same r.
The underlying idea to defend against voter-
coercion is the same as [12]. One improvement this
scheme made is that it reduces the time complexity
from quadratic to linear. In order to identify valid
votes in liner time, instead of using pairwise plain-
text equivalence test (which takes O(N2) time,
N is the number of voters), it only checks the
equivalence of two elements in ballots. This reduces
identification time to O(V ), where V is the total
number of votes. The authors also demonstrated
that their scheme is resistant to three attacks
defined in [12].
5.10 Philip et al. [24]
In [24]’s registration stage, voters are provided with
pairs of usernames and passwords, which are used
for later identity validation. They modified ElGamal
cryptosystem to make it additive homomorphic and
used it for ballots encryption. Voters’ encrypted
ballots are re-encrypted again with some random
numbers which are unknown to voters. In such a
way, voters cannot construct receipts to prove their
votes. In order to make the system robust, they
designed multiple authorities and tallies. Although
it is receipt-free, voters can still sell their passwords
to buyers, as it has no protection measures for
passwords. Similarly, coercers can force voters to tell
them their passwords.
5.11 Selections [26]
Selections is a voter-coercion resistant protocol for
Internet voting [26]. It requires voters to register at
a private booth in person. In the registration stage,
each voter can get a password from a panic password
system [53], and its homomorphic encryption will
be published in the public roster. Voters can choose
passwords and a large number of panic passwords.
By giving panic passwords to coercers, voters can
avoid following coercers’ instructions. In the voting
stage, voters submit commitments to their asserted
passwords (real or panic), and the re-encryptions of
their public entries, and votes are passed through a
mix-net for anonymization. Tallies check the validity
of each submission and eliminate duplicate records.
5.12 Caveat Coercitor [25]
Instead of considering voter-coercion resistance,
Caveat Coercitor [25] proposed a protocol which
satisfies coercion-evidence. Unlike voter-coercion
resistant systems, Caveat Coercitor tolerates
coercions but records unforgeable evidence for
voter-coercions. It outputs the evidence of the
amount of suspicious voter-coercions that occurred
in the elections. Observers can decide whether or
not the outcome is valid based on the number of
suspicious ballots. By relaxing strict voter-coercion
resistance requirements, it weakens the system’s
assumptions and makes them more practically
acceptable. It allows coerced voters to be able
to cast their intended votes without letting an
adversary find it.
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Caveat Coercitor is composed of two parts:
coercion test and coercer independence. Coercion
test outputs a number (it is called degree of coercion
in the paper) within an estimated range. This
number estimates the number of coerced voters
in the election. it is crucial that number is an
approximation of coerced voters, so that dishonest
voters can also claim that they were coerced by
attackers even though this was not the case. Coercer
independence allows coerced voters to still be able
to cast votes for their desired candidates without
being detected by coercers. To achieve coercer
independence, for each coerced voter Vc who is
forced to vote for Cc, there must be at least one
free honest voter Vf who really wants to vote for
Cc. The idea here is that, by switching Vc and Vf ’s
votes such that coercer cannot distinguish between
them. In this case, in addition to Vf ’s original vote
for Cc, Vf can also vote for another candidate, so
Vf ’s ballots will be canceled. One the other hand,
if Vc abstains from the election, only the coercer’s
instruction will be implemented, which is Cc in this
case. Therefore, the final outcome is the same in
these two scenarios: only one vote for Cc is valid,
and one of them will be counted as a suspicious
coerced vote. We can see that although the coerced
voter can still cast for her/his intended candidate,
the coercion increases suspicious ballots, which are
invalid in elections. The number of suspicious ballots
may have an effect on election results if there is a
very small gap between the winner and the loser.
6 Comparisons of remote E-voting
systems
In this section, we compare the above existing
remote E-voting systems based on several criteria.
For example, we will see whether or not they
satisfy receipt-freeness, vote-selling resistance and
voter-coercion resistance, and what cryptography
primitives they used.
6.1 Anonymization techniques
As we know, anonymization is a very basic
requirement for remote E-voting systems. Without
anonymizing voters’ identities and their votes,
attackers can easily check for whom each voter
votes. This violates vote privacy as defined in
the previous section. According to [10], remote E-
voting systems can be divided into three categories
based on the techniques they used to achieve
anonymization.
Blind signature allows registrars to sign voters’
ballots, but without disclosing voters’ choices to
authorities. It keeps links between voters and
their choices secret. Systems using blind signature
include: [42] [64] [65] [66].
Similarly, homomorphic encryption can directly
operate on encrypted ballots without leaking voters’
choices (plain-texts). Therefore it also can be used
to prevent the relationships between voters and
their choices from being revealed to others. [50] [67]
[56] belong to this category.
Mix-net is another widely used technique and it
shuffles voters’ ballots and makes them untraceable
[10] [12] [25] [68] [69]. Each mixer only knows its
own permutation order, but has no knowledge about
others such that even an individual mixer cannot
figure out the combined permutation.
6.2 Security properties
In Section 2.2, we listed several security properties
that practical remote E-voting systems should
satisfy, including the three focused on in this paper.
In this section, we analyze how many properties
these systems satisfy. Results are shown in Table 1.
We can see that some properties, like democracy and
vote-privacy, are satisfied by all the listed systems.
This means these are very basic requirements for
remote E-voting systems, or even for traditional
paper based voting systems.
In Section 4.3 we mentioned that there are four
protection measures for voter-coercion attacks. Of
these, fake credential and panic password are very
similar: both of them generate invalid tokens and
give them to coercers. Apart from fake tokens,
voters use their real tokens to cast ballots. Explicit
notification is another a straightforward way to deal
with voter-coercion; however it is not robust, as
notification itself can be eavesdropped by attackers,
or tallies can be corrupted in some cases. Coercion-
evidence uses a similar idea to explicit notification,
instead of prohibiting coercion it records coercion-
evidence. However, it is much more complex and
robust than intuitively explicit notifications.
For the above voter-coercion resistant systems,
we categorize them based on the protection
measures they used. Table 2 shows each system’s
protection measure.
6.3 Comparison based on trust assumptions
From these existing remote E-voting systems, we
can see that more or less they all make some trust
assumptions in order to satisfy those properties. We
can briefly divide assumptions into two categories:
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Hirt et al. [50] Yes UV Yes Yes Yes No
Lee et al. [23] Yes UV Yes Yes Yes No
Juels et al. [12] Yes UV Yes Yes Yes Yes
Civitas [10] Yes UV Yes Yes Yes Yes
Helios [52] Yes UV&SIV Yes No No No
Helios2.0 [22] Yes UV&SIV Yes No No No
PGD [59] Yes UV&WIV Yes No No No
Meng [45] Yes UV Yes Yes Yes Yes
AFT [46] Yes UV Yes Yes Yes Yes
Philip et al. [24] Yes UV Yes Yes No No
Selections [26] Yes UV&WIV Yes Yes Yes Yes
Caveat Coercitor [25] Yes UV&WIV Yes Yes Yes Yes
UV: Universal Verifiability; WIV: Weak Individual Verifiability; SIV: Strong Individual Verifiability;
Table 2 Categories based on protection measures
Schemes Fake credential Coercion-evidence Explicit message Panic password
















Table 3 Trust assumptions in remote E-voting systems
Systems Registration channel Voting channel Registrars tallies
Hirt et al. [50] untappable channel untappable channel minor-corrupted minor-corrupted




Juels et al. [12] untappable channel anonymous channel minor-corrupted minor-corrupted
Civitas [10] untappable channel anonymous channel minor-corrupted minor-corrupted












Meng [45] regular channel anonymous channel minor-corrupted minor-corrupted
AFT [46] untappable channel anonymous channel minor-corrupted minor-corrupted
Philip et al. [24] untappable channel anonymous channel minor-corrupted minor-corrupted
Selections [26] in-person anonymous channel minor-corrupted minor-corrupted
Caveat Coercitor [25] regular channel anonymous channel minor-corrupted minor-corrupted
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Table 4 Cryptography primitives used by schemes




Hirt et al. [50]
√ √ √
ElGamal
Lee et al. [23]
√ √ √
ElGamal
Juels et al. [12]













√ √ √ Exponential
ElGamal
PGD [59]
√ √ √ √ √ ElGamal&Exponential
ElGamal
Meng [45]
√ √ √ √ BCP&Exponential
ElGamal
AFT [46]
√ √ √ √ √ √ Modified
ElGamal
Philip et al. [24]
√ √ √ Modified
ElGamal
Selections [26]
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
ElGamal
Caveat Coercitor [25]
√ √ √ √ √ √
ElGamal
BS: Blind Signature; SS: Secret Sharing; HERE: Homomorphic Encryption and Re-Encryption; MN: Mix-
nets; PET: Plain-text Equivalence Test; ZKP: Zero Knowledge Proof; DVP: Designated Verifier Proof; DVRP:
Designated Verifier Reencryption Proof;
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strong assumptions and weak assumptions, based on
the extent of difficulties to achieve them in reality.
For example, compared with untappable channels,
anonymous channels are weaker assumptions as
they are easier to be implemented in reality.
Remember that in this paper we divided
assumptions into channels assumptions and agents
assumptions. Regarding the channels, there are two
main types of channels: anonymous and untappable
channels. Regarding agents, as we indicated before,
we categorize them into two categories: non-
corrupted and minor-corrupted. Table 3 shows the
analysis for the above remote E-voting systems’
trust assumptions. For channels, we divide them
into registration channel and voting channel, while
agents include registrars and tallies. Basically the
registration channel is used for voters to obtain
their credentials or keys, while the voting channel
is involved in the whole voting stage. Here regular
channel only requires that messages are able to
reach the destinations. Note that as indicated in
the full version of [12], we regard systems using
anonymization techniques as using anonymous
channels.
6.4 Used cryptography primitives
In this section, we summarize what cryptography
primitives were used in the above remote E-voting
systems in order to achieve security properties.
We also specify which cryptosystems, e.g. ElGamal
cryptosystem, were used by these remote E-voting
systems. We summarize this in Table 4.
Note that although almost all the listed systems
use the secret sharing mechanism, there is some
difference among them. Secret sharing can be used
in two stages: the registration stage and the tallying
stage. Some systems, like Caveat Coercitor [25],
use secret sharing in both stages; however, some
of them, like [12], only use secret sharing for
decryption in the tallying stage. Also, we can see
that Zero-knowledge proof is almost essential for all
remote E-voting systems.
7 Conclusions
As people and governments are now treating remote
E-voting systems more and more seriously, their
underlying security issues are attracting much more
attentions. Due to the nature of remote E-voting
systems, they are more difficult to be supervised
compared with traditional methods. One of the
most serious issues is security in elections, it can
cause elections to be invalid if systems cannot figure
it out.
In this paper, we examine several existing remote
E-voting systems, and analyze their properties in
terms of receipt-freeness, vote-selling resistance and
voter-coercion resistance. In addition to that, we
also examine other common properties that remote
E-voting systems must satisfy.
By examining these existing schemes, we find
that although some of them exhibit more robust
attributes than others, more further works are
needed in this field.
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